My research takes up problems in the philosophy of art where they intersect with broader issues in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language. In particular, my work has focused on taking seriously the premise that art is a fundamentally social practice whose nature is thoroughly conventional. Yet even though conventions are arbitrary and historically-contingent creatures, I don't think this means that the philosophy of art has to be an exercise in bare conceptual analysis. Instead, I think that we have no privileged epistemic access to the ontology of art and other social kinds, and that it is our best reflective understanding of our social practices that should constrain our theorizing. To my mind, the philosophy of art is first and foremost an explanatory enterprise, and its main concern should be to ground the explanatory hypotheses of empirical art scholarship.
I am currently working on a monograph concerning the explanatory role that intuitions and expert testimony play in grounding our judgements about the ontology of artworks and other social kinds. A growing body of anthropological, art-historical, and psychological evidence indicates that our artworld-intuitions reflect entirely arbitrary historical interests that are not shared by members of other cultures, nor even by our own cultural predecessors. This consensus presents a problem for the ontology of art, where theory-choice is guided primarily by appeal to intuitions about “hard” cases and descriptive adequacy. My goal is to explain whether and when such appeals are epistemically sound, and to offer a reliable methodological framework for testing our artworld-intuitions.
"What makes a kind an art-kind?" British Journal of Aesthetics (Forthcoming 2019). Winner of the 2018 BSA Essay Prize.
“Social Kinds, Reference, and Meta-Ontological Revisionism,” Journal of Social Ontology (forthcoming 2019). Runner-up, 2018 JSO Essay Prize.
"Entitled Art: what makes titles names?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2018.1488267).
“Fake Views—or why concepts are bad guides to art’s ontology,” British Journal of Aesthetics 58.2 (2018),193-207
“The Trouble with Poetic License,” British Journal of Aesthetics 56.2 (2016), 149-61.
Chapters & Collections (* = peer reviewed, double-masked) (2)
* “Schopenhauer’s Perceptive Invective,” Mathematics, Logic and Language in Schopenhauer, Springer Studies in Universal Logic. Jens Lemanski (Ed.). Springer. (accepted, forthcoming)
“Willingly disinterested: altruism in Schopenhauer’s ethics,” in Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010 (Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense: Proceedings of the XI International Kant Congress 2010). Stefano Bacin (Ed.), Alfredo Ferrarin (Ed.), Claudio La Rocca (Ed.) and Margit Ruffing (Ed.). Boston: De Gruyter, 2013.
Review of Tiziana Andina, The Philosophy of Art: The Question of Definition (Bloomsbury, 2013), Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74.1 (Winter 2016), p. 106-8.
Review of Christy Mag Uidhir, Art & Art-Attempts (Oxford University Press, 2013), Philosophy in Review 35.3 (June 2015), p. 182-4.
Works in Progress or Under Review (*) (drafts available upon request)
A paper on tourism* - In which I argue against the common view of aesthetic tourists as bowing to the will of the herd and choosing aesthetic experiences which are the inauthentic product of aesthetic luck. Instead, I argue that aesthetic tourists are driven to see the sights they see by two closely related factors, both of which they share in common with aesthetic experts: (1) a deep-seated commitment to the acquaintance principle, which states that aesthetic experiences are intransmissible and must be had first-hand, and (2) by a sense that they have an aesthetic obligation to see these sights, in light of their practical identities.
A paper on fiction* - In which I argue that the weight of our critical and reflective literary practices motivates the conclusion that story-truth is constrained by the law of non-contradiction. In particular, I argue that the conventions reflected in our practices mean that an author cannot successfully write a universal fiction (a story according to which everything is true).
A paper on art-making* - In which I show that action theory provides a useful framework for thinking about the ontology of art. In particular, it can help us to get clear about what we mean (or what we should mean) when we claim that art is intention-dependent. I argue that, properly understood, the commitment to art's intention-dependence entails its concept-independence.
A paper on literary criticism - In which I argue that certain kinds of criticism are explanatory dead ends because (1) they are not concerned with fictional truth (or plausibility) in the first place, and (2) they read into the stories they purport to analyze a background of false "facts" and theories which are then used to support dubious meta-textual claims about the real world.
A paper on coincident objects - In which I argue that many problems of coincidence—especially statue problems—are the illusory result of a fairly common linguistic phenomenon: the use of partitive terms to individuate uses of non-count nouns (NCNs). By marking partitives and NCNs, I argue that we can easily account for the intuition that a statue and its matter are identical, as well as our tendency to think of them as having different identity-conditions.
It is a truism among philosophers that art is intention-dependent—i.e., art-making is an activity that depends in some way on the maker’s intentions—but not much thought has been given to just what this entails. My dissertation explores this lacuna, arguing that, properly understood, intention-dependence sets a number of important constraints on theories of art. In particular, I argue that taking intention-dependence seriously allows us to supply success- and failure-conditions for art-attempts, to identify artistic practices cross-culturally, and to pinpoint the reference of ‘art’ and art-kind terms. For a more detailed abstract, click here.